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Abstract
This paper develops a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model in which intertemporal
fluctuations (and sectoral co-movement) are driven by idiosyncratic shocks to relative preferences
among consumption goods. This class of shocks may be interpreted as shifts in consumer tastes.
When shifts in preferences occur, consumers associate a new and different level of satisfaction to
the same basket of consumption goods according to their modified preferences. This paper shows
that if the initial composition of the consumption basket is sufficiently asymmetric, then a shift
in relative preferences produces a “perception effect” strong enough to induce both intersectoral
and intrasectoral positive co-movement of the main macroeconomic variables (i.e., output, con-
sumption, investment, and employment). Furthermore, by extending the theoretical framework to
a multisector model and introducing a more flexible structure for the relative-preference shock,
we show that the parameter restrictions needed to observe sectoral co-movement after a relative-
preference shock are much less severe. In particular, co-movement among most of the sectors
emerges under general conditions, without requiring high levels of asymmetry in the consump-
tion basket’s composition and/or high aversion to risk. It is a welcome result that these findings
are reached without introducing aggregate technology shocks, input-output linkages, or shocks
perturbing the relative preference between aggregate consumption and leisure.
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1 Introduction
The co-movement of economic activity across different sectors is one of the most
important regularities of all business cycles (Lucas, 1977). Burns and Mitchell
(1946) include intersectoral co-movement in their definition of business cycles, and
many empirical studies demonstrate pro-cyclical behavior of cross-sector measures
of employment, output, and investment (Christiano and Fitzgerald, 1998; Huffman
and Wynne, 1999). It is difficult to identify reasonable aggregate disturbances that
are capable of explaining historical business cycles, so a vast literature investigates
the transmission mechanisms from sectoral shocks to aggregate fluctuations. This
approach has dealt with two main challenges: (i) explaining how sectoral fluctua-
tions spread over the entire economy; and (ii) explaining why sectors move together.
The multisector dynamic general equilibrium literature uses productivity shocks
and technological linkages to explain sectoral co-movement. In fact, the input–
output structure grants that fluctuations in each sector take the same direction after
an idiosyncratic productivity shock.1 Cooper and Haltiwanger (1990) highlight the
role of demand. These authors suggest that the normality of demands for consump-
tion goods is the channel through which sectoral shocks spread over the economy;
meanwhile, the main mechanism of shocks’ intertemporal transmission relies on the
low number of sectors holding inventories. In this framework, an increase in inven-
tories immediately reduces both the production and the income in sectors holding
inventories. This, in turn, reduces the demand for goods produced in the other
sectors, and hence the expected positive co-movements of employment and output
emerge.
Departing from the existing economic mechanisms implemented by the cited
literature, this paper develops a framework without introducing either exogenous
changes to productivity or input–output linkages and without relying on the “in-
come effect” as in Cooper and Haltiwanger (1990).
In this paper, fluctuations are induced by exogenous shocks to the structure of
preferences. In particular, shocks affect consumers’ relative preferences among
consumption goods. We show that this class of preference shock is capable of
explaining the positive co-movements of output, consumption, investment, and em-
ployment among sectors. It is important to emphasize that this kind of shock affects
only relative preferences among consumption goods; it does not directly modify the
preference relation between the composite consumption good and leisure time.
1Selected references are Long and Plosser (1983), Murphy et al. (1989), Hornstein and Praschnik
(1997), Horvath (1998, 2000), and Huffman and Wynne (1999).
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substitution between consumption and leisure.
The stylized economy is characterized as follows. Consider a two-sector econ-
omy where, in each sector, a distinct output is produced by using labor services
(freely mobile across sectors) and a sector-specific capital stock; the sector-specific
output yields one type of consumption good and one type of investment good that
can be used as capital but only in the same sector. This assumption precludes sec-
toral co-movement induced by complementarity in the production process. Utility is
defined over leisure and a consumption index that includes the consumption goods
of both sectors. Next, assume that the consumption index is a Cobb–Douglas (ho-
mogeneous of degree 1) function over the consumption goods. Hence, the modeled
preference shifts constitute the only exogenous source of intertemporal, intersec-
toral, and intrasectoral dynamics of employment, consumption, output, and invest-
ment.
We interpret the dynamics by focusing on different ways of perceiving the same
consumption basket according to the state of the relative preferences. The balance
of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the benchmark economy.
Section 3 presents the theoretical mechanism and selected numerical results. Sec-
tion 4 discusses and extends model results, and Section 5 concludes. Finally, the
Appendix includes all proofs and derivations.
2 A Two-Sector Model with Relative-Preference Shifts
This section presents the baseline dynamic equilibrium model with relative-preference
shocks. Because there are no restrictions to trade, we solve the dynamic planning
problem of a benevolent planner.
2.1 The Benchmark Economy
The benchmark model is structured as a two-sector, two-good economy with en-
dogenous labor supply choice. There is a continuum of identical households of
total measure 1. The relative demands for goods are driven by autonomous changes
in preferences of the representative household. Capital goods are sector specific,
whereas labor services can be reallocated across sectors without bearing any ad-
justment cost.
Thus our mechanism differs from the one addressed by Wen (2006, 2007) and
Bencivenga (1992), who investigate the effects of variations in the marginal rate of
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2.1.1 Preferences
Define a Cobb–Douglas consumption index as follows:
Ct = c
s1,t
1,t c
s2,t
2,t , (1)
where c1,t and c2,t denote (respectively) the consumption of good 1 and good 2 at
time t; s1,t and s2,t denote the preference weights and follow exogenous stochas-
tic processes (to be defined shortly).2 In this framework, a positive shock to s1,t
changes the instantaneous structure of preferences in favor of good 1. In order to
analyze aggregate consequences of only the relative-preference shifts among con-
sumption goods, we preserve the homotheticity (of degree 1) of preferences and
assume that s1,t + s2,t = 1 for all t = 1, 2, .... It is then sufficient to specify that s1
follows an autoregressive process: s1,t = ρs1,t−1+(1− ρ) s1+εt, where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1
and s1 indicates the steady-state value. Quantity εt is a random variable normally
distributed with zero mean and variance σ2ε . A relative-preference shock {ε1,t}
∞
t=1
is transitory but has persistent effects because of the preference structure. Finally,
it is important to note that Ct is not the aggregate consumption reported in national
accounts at time t; in other words, Ct is not a macroeconomic aggregate but rather
an index that represents the structure of preferences. We will return to this subject
later.
Preferences over consumption index Ct and leisure ℓt are described by a state-
dependent felicity function U(C (ct) , ℓt; st) : R2+ × S2 × [0, 1]
2 → R:
U(ct, ℓt; st) =
(Ct)
1−γ − 1
1− γ
+Bℓt, (2)
where γ measures the degree of risk aversion and is inversely proportional to the
elasticity of intertemporal substitution; ℓt denotes leisure hours. In order to better
understand the behavior of demands for consumption goods, we assume that the
marginal utility of leisure is constant and equal to B.3 Leisure hours are defined as
ℓt = 1− n1,t − n2,t, (3)
where n1,t and n2,t denote working hours in sector 1 and 2, respectively. The struc-
ture implies that available hours are normalized to 1 and that labor services shift
across sectors without adjustment costs.
2Also Stockman and Tesar (1995) use the Cobb–Douglas aggregator for tradable consumption
goods in a two-country framework.
3In a later section we show that linearity in leisure is not a necessary condition. Our assump-
tion here simplifies the explanation of the mechanism underlying the relative-preference shifts in
consumption goods.
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2.1.2 Production Technologies
Each good is produced by physical capital and labor using a sector-specific Cobb–
Douglas production function:
y1,t = λ1k
α1
1,tn
1−α1
1,t and y2,t = λ2kα22,tn1−α22,t . (4)
Here yj,t, kj,t, and λj denote (respectively) output, capital stock, and technology
level in sector j for j = 1, 2 (j = 1, 2 hereafter) and where αj measures the elas-
ticity of output to capital in sector j. Production is not subject to exogenous tech-
nology changes (i.e., the λj parameters are constant over time). As remarked in the
Introduction, this assumption strongly differentiates our model from the traditional
approach that focuses on the effects of idiosyncratic productivity shocks.
The allocation constraint is specific for each sector and is given by
c1,t + i1,t = y1,t and c2,t + i2,t = y2,t, (5)
where ij,t denotes the investment flows at time t.
In each sector, capital accumulation follows the standard formulation
k1,t+1 = (1− δ1)k1,t + i1,t and k2,t+1 = (1− δ2)k2,t + i2,t, (6)
where δj denotes the depreciation rate of capital stocks at time t. Equations (4)–(6)
dictate that the capital stock used in sector j be produced entirely in sector j. This
hypothesis makes capital goods fixed across sectors and thereby rules out input–
output transmission mechanisms. Hence we can isolate the way preferences drive
intersectoral co-movements with no influence from production processes.
2.1.3 The Model’s Solution and Equilibrium Characterization
The planner maximizes the expected present discounted value of the
return function V0 = E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tU(ct, ℓt; st), where β (0 < β < 1) is a subjective
discount factor. The maximization problem is subject to the allocation constraints
(equation (5)), the capital accumulation constraints (equation (6)), and the total-
hour constraint (equation (3)). The state of the economy at time t is represented by
a vector χt = 〈k1,t, k2,t, s1,t, s2,t〉. Controls for the problem are consumption flows
c, investment flows i, and labor services n. Once we introduce dynamic multipliers
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φ1,t and φ2,t, forming the Langrangean L0 yields
max
{cj,t,nj,t,kj,t+1}
2
j=1
L0 = E0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{(
c
s1,t
1,t c
s2,t
2,t
)1−γ
− 1
1− γ
+B (1− n1,t − n2,t)
+φ1,t
[
λ1k
α1
1,tn
1−α1
1,t − c1,t + (1− δ1) k1,t − k1,t+1
]
+φ2,t
[
λ2k
α2
2,tn
1−α2
2,t − c2,t + (1− δ2) k2,t − k2,t+1
]}
,(7)
where E0 is the conditional expectation operator on time-0 information. First-order
conditions with respect to jth consumption flow and working hours (FOC(cj,t),
FOC(nj,t)) read:
c1,t : s1,tc
s1,t−1
1,t c
s2,t
2,t
(
c
s1,t
1,t c
s2,t
2,t
)−γ
= φ1,t,
c2,t : s2,tc
s1,t
1,t c
s2,t−1
2,t
(
c
s1,t
1,t c
s2,t
2,t
)−γ
= φ2,t; (8)
n1,t : B = φ1,t (1− α1)λ1k
α1
1,tn
−α1
1,t ,
n2,t : B = φ2,t (1− α2)λ2k
α2
2,tn
−α2
2,t . (9)
Here (1− αj)λjk
αj
j,tn
−αj
j,t = wj,t is the marginal productivity of labor in sector j.
Combining the previous equations, we can rewrite the optimality conditions for
sectoral consumptions and working hours as
s1,t
C1−γt
c1,t
w1,t = B,
s2,t
C1−γt
c2,t
w2,t = B. (10)
Optimality conditions (equation (10)) indicate the standard equality between the
weighted marginal utility of consumption, sj,t
(
C1−γt /cj,t
)
, and the weighted mar-
ginal utility of leisure, B/wj,t.
Optimal investment dynamics are determined by the Euler equations
βEt
s1,t+1 C1−γt+1c1,t+1
s1,t
C1−γt
c1,t
(
α1λ1k
α1−1
1,t+1n
1−α1
1,t+1 + (1− δ1)
) = 1,
βEt
s2,t+1 C1−γt+1c2,t+1
s2,t
C1−γt
c2,t
(
α2λ2k
α2−1
2,t+1n
1−α2
2,t+1 + (1− δ2)
) = 1, (11)
5
Addessi and Busato: Relative-Preference Shifts and the Business Cycle
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
where Et denotes the expectation operator conditional on the information available
at time t. Observe that the pricing kernel
Πj,t =
(
C1−γt+1 /C
1−γ
t
)
((sj,t+1cj,t) / (sj,tcj,t+1))
depends on the dynamics of the preference parameters, the consumption of goods,
and the consumption index.
The system of optimal conditions and resource constraints determines the de-
terministic steady state; then, the log-linearization of the model around this steady
state describes the dynamics.4 Next we describe the model’s parameterization be-
fore presenting the simulation results.
2.2 Parameterization
The system of equations that defines the dynamic equilibrium of the model depends
on a set of twelve parameters. Six pertain to technology (the capital share αj , the
capital stock quarterly depreciation rate δj , and the level of technology λj in both
sectors). The other six pertain to consumer’s preferences (the subjective discount
factor β, the relative risk aversion coefficient γ, the marginal utility of leisure B,
the relative preferences for good 1 s1 and s2 for good 2, and the autoregressive
coefficient of the preference process ρ).5
The sectors are characterized by the same technology so that all differences be-
tween the equilibrium values of the sectoral variables will derive from consumer
preferences. This assumption makes it easy to associate the parameterization of
the relative preferences among consumption goods to the composition of the initial
consumption basket. In fact, under the symmetric hypothesis on the supply side,
we have c1 R c2 if and only if s1 R s2. Assuming differences in the supply side
would complicate our exposition of the mechanisms with no significant added value
in the understanding of the role of preferences. The model is parameterized for the
postwar U.S. economy, except for relative-preference parameters that are used to
set up the theoretic investigation.
Technology parameters (δj , αj, λj): These are set to commonly used values in
the real business cycle (RBC) literature. In particular, we consider a symmetric
economy from the supply side, so δ1 = δ2 = 0.025, α1 = α2 = 0.36, and λ1 =
λ2 = 1.
Consumer preferences (β, γ, B, sj, ρ): The quarterly subjective discount factor
β is set to correspond to an annual real interest rate of 4%; it yields β = 0.99. The
4Following Uhlig (1999), Appendix A and Appendix C report the steps used to determine the
steady-state values and the dynamic equations of the model.
5Recall that s2, the preference parameter for good 2, is set equal to 1− s1.
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relative risk aversion γ is equal to 5. The relative preference for good 1, s1, varies
in the range 0 < s1 < 1. The autoregressive coefficient of the preference process
ρ is 0.99. The marginal utility of leisure, B, is endogenously calibrated to generate
n1 + n2 = 0.3.
6
3 Results
3.1 Structure of the Simulations
This section investigates how the stylized economy responds to an increase in the
relative preference for good 1. Anticipating a result, the initial composition of the
consumption basket is a key element for determining the sign of intersectoral co-
movements; for this reason, the model is simulated for different compositions of
the consumption basket in steady state.
The simulations show how the dynamics change according to the relative weight
of each good in the consumption basket. In order to explain the emerging results,
we introduce a “perception effect” that describes how a consumer’s satisfaction, for
a given consumption choice, changes according to the state of her preferences. We
then use sensitivity analysis to investigate the role of selected parameters.
3.2 Baseline Simulations
This paper examines three different pre-shock scenarios: a fully symmetric con-
sumption basket with s1/s2 = c1/c2 = 1 (s1 = 0.5); and two asymmetric con-
sumption baskets with s1/s2 = c1/c2 = 19 (s1 = 0.1) or s1/s2 = c1/c2 = 9
(s1 = 0.9).
Technically, we run three sets of simulations while maintaining the baseline cal-
ibration —except for the steady-state value of s1. We set s1 equal to 0.1, 0.5, and
0.9; we then report the impulse response functions of the sectoral variables in Fig-
ure 1 with (respectively) blue, green, and red lines. To ease the comparison between
consequences of the different settings, we impose that the preference shocks always
have the same magnitude: 1% of 0.5. Thus, immediately after the shock, s1 moves
from 0.1 to 0.105 (blue line), from 0.5 to 0.505 (green line), and from 0.9 to 0.905
(red line).
Figure 1 describes (as do most of the remaining figures) the impulse response
functions of labor services (n1, n2), consumption (c1, c2), investment (i1, i2), and
output (y1, y2) of both sectors; C is the consumption basket as defined in equation
(1), and N = n1 + n2 is the total employment. The last two boxes refer to the ratio
6See Appendix B.
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions, benchmark version
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between the marginal utility of each consumption good and the marginal utility of
leisure (p1 = Uc1/Ul, p2 = Uc2/Ul), that we may consider the price of each good
when the marginal utility of leisure is the nume´raire. The figure shows the first 80
quarterly percentage deviations from a scenario in which all innovations are set to
0.
The green lines (with s1 = s2 = 0.5) in Figure 1 show an economy whose input
factors (n2 and i2) have been withdrawn from the production of good 2 (y2 and c2
decrease) and allocated to sector 1. Intrasectoral co-movements among consump-
tion, investment, employment, and output are positive in both sectors, but intersec-
toral co-movements are negative. In fact, the sector characterized by an increase in
preference (sector 1) goes through an expansive phase while the other sector goes
through a recessive phase. Prices follow the direction of the preference weights.
The blue lines (with s1 = 0.1, s2 = 0.9) show an economy with both sectors in
expansion. Both intersectoral and intrasectoral co-movements are positive. Prices
co-move, and p2 increases even if s2 falls.
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economy characterized by positive intersectoral and intrasectoral co-movements;
however, the dynamics are completely reversed. The stylized economy experiences
a recession in both sectors and in all variables (consumption, investment, employ-
ment, and output). Prices co-move with different dynamics for p1 and s1.
3.3 Source of Intersectoral Co-movement
Roughly speaking, the representative agent chooses among the consumption of two
different goods and leisure. Under the preference structure reported in equations
(1) and (2), the marginal rate of substitution between sector specific consumption
and leisure depends on the consumption of both goods. In fact, the influence of cj
on consumer utility (i.e., the marginal utility of cj) is given by the effect of cj on C
and by the effect of C on the utility function. If preferences shift then both effects
vary, but we shall demonstrate that only the latter can induce positive intersectoral
co-movement.
In the previous three simulations (reported in Figure 1), following the positive
shock to s1 the ceteris paribus effect of c1 on C increases while the effect of c2 on
C decreases.7 This produces a “substitution” effect that reduces consumption of
good 2 and increases consumption of good 1. After a preference shift, then, the Ccj
change in a way that does not sustain positive intersectoral co-movements. On the
contrary, the ceteris paribus change of C affects the optimal choice in both sectors
in the same direction. In fact, if C decreases (increases) then the marginal impact
of C on the utility function increases (decreases), which in turn pushes up (down)
the marginal utility of both goods. We call this change the perception effect. It has
no impact on the marginal rate of substitution between c1 and c2, but it does affect
the marginal rate of substitution between each consumption good and leisure.8
The blue-line case describes a context where the perception effect increases the
marginal utility of both consumption goods. The reverse occurs in the red-line case:
the marginal utility of consumption basket has fallen, so sector 1 also experiences a
recession phase. In both cases, it is evident that positive intersectoral co-movements
are driven by sectoral (and not aggregate) preference shocks. Finally, the green
lines report dynamics where the perception effect is absent; in this case, only the
substitution effect matters.
7In Appendix D and E (respectively) we prove that Cc1s1 > 0 and Cc2s1 < 0.
8The preference shock generates a sort of “real wealth” effect, if we assume that real wealth is
measurable by the level of utility a consumer can reach. Indeed, after the shock, satisfaction varies
because the consumer associates revised levels of satisfaction to the same goods. Hence satisfaction
changes even when consumption is fixed. However, even if we adopt the previous definition, this
mechanism would be quite different from what is reported in microeconomics manuals. In fact, the
first element to change is not the budget constraint but rather the indifference curve.
The red lines (with s1 = 0.9, s2 = 0.1), similarly to the previous case, show an
9
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Table 1 summarizes the possible scenarios after a positive shock to s1.
Table 1: Possible dynamics of consumption after a positive shock to s1.
Before the shock Perception Substitution Final result
c1 < c2
c1 ↑
c2 ↑
c1 ↑
c2 ↓
c1 ↑
c2 ↑↓
c1 = c2
c1 ↔
c2 ↔
c1 ↑
c2 ↓
c1 ↑
c2 ↓
c1 > c2
c1 ↓
c2 ↓
c1 ↑
c2 ↓
c1 ↑↓
c2 ↓
Now let’s address the argument from an analytical perspective. The starting
point is the optimal condition that determines the choice between consumption and
leisure in each sector:
Ucjwj = UCCcjwj = B. (12)
Equation (12) imposes that, in equilibrium, the marginal utility of consumption
of good j, Ucj , when weighted with the marginal productivity of labor in sector j,
wj, must be equal to the marginal utility of leisure, B.9 The marginal utility of
cj can be decomposed as the product of the first derivative of the utility function
with respect to the consumption basket, UC (i.e., the marginal utility of C), and the
first derivative of the consumption basket with respect to the single consumption
good, Ccj . The key question concerns what happens to UC after an increase in s1
(as in our simulations). In order to provide an answer, we must focus on the signs
of two derivatives. The first is the sign of the derivative of the marginal utility
UC with respect to the consumption basket (i.e., the second derivative of the utility
function with respect to the consumption basket). This sign is negative; in fact,
UCC = −γC
−γ−1 < 0 for γ ≥ 0.
The second sign applies to the partial derivative of the consumption basket with
respect to the exogenous shock, Cs1 .10 The sign of this derivative depends on the
ratio between the consumption goods that make up the consumption basket: Cs1 =
cs11 c
1−s1
2 ln(c1/c2).
11 In the blue-line version (reported in Figure 1), s1 = 0.1 and so
9If we assume that B is constant, then the dynamics of equation (12) can be expressed as s˜j,t −
c˜j,t + (1− γ) C˜t + αj k˜j,t − αj n˜j,t = 0, where the tilde indicates the growth rate. This way of
representing the dynamics characterizing equation (12) may facilitate understanding the mechanism
described in this section.
10We are interested in the direct effect of s1 on C, taking the rest as given. This is why we do not
consider the indirect effect generated by variations in consumption composition.
11Recall that in our model the supply sides of each sector are perfectly symmetric; it follows that
10
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c1/c2 < 1; hence Cs1 < 0. If C falls then UC rises.12 In this case, the direct effect
of a positive shock to s1 is a reduction in C and then an increase in UC . Notice that,
according to the optimal conditions of equation (12), the product Ccjwj must fall
in both sectors. This can occur either by an increase in cj (since the derivative of
Ccj with respect to cj is negative; in fact, Cc1c1 = s1 (s1 − 1) c
s1−2
1 c
1−s1
2 < 0 and
Cc2c2 = −s1 (1− s1) c
s1
1 c
−s1−1
2 < 0) or by an increase in employment nj (to reduce
wj). The reverse occurs in the case with s1 = 0.9 (red lines in Figure 1).13
This mechanism helps to explain the positive intersectoral co-movements re-
ported in the cases with blue and red lines. It also explains why economic booms
(dooms) occur after a preference shock when s1 is set low (high).
Finally, the green lines represent a perfectly symmetric economy: s1 = 0.5,
c1/c2 = 1, Cs1 = 0. The direct effect of preference shifts on UC is null, so the
dynamics of the stylized economy are driven only by substitution effects among
sectoral goods.
We have not described all the forces at work because we are mainly interested in
the mechanisms that induce positive intersectoral co-movements. Therefore, as in-
dicated by the arrows in Table 1, the initial composition of the consumption basket
represents a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for observing positive intersec-
toral co-movements in response to relative-preference shifts.
Before extending the analysis to addressing the role of some selected parameters,
a further clarification of our results is needed. As mentioned previously, C does
not equal aggregate consumption. To build aggregate macroeconomic variables we
should define the aggregation technique, and to test our model we should introduce
a more realistic structure with linkages in the supply side. But this is beyond our
purpose. Our aim is simply to describe a possible new source of intersectoral co-
movement, so it suffices to focus on sectoral variables. Yet it is still worth noting
that, in the cases with intersectoral co-movement (blue and red lines in Figure 1),
sectoral real variables and prices move in the same direction. This suggests that
emerging sectoral dynamics (expansion or recession) should characterize the paths
of aggregate variables in the same way. Thus, the results reported in Figure 1 should
be consistent with a positive correlation between aggregate variables.
the relative dimensions of steady-state values of the sectoral variables depend only on consumer
preferences. Then c1 R c2 if and only if s1 R s2.
12If we assume a CES function for the consumption index, then the economic mechanism
does not change significantly. In fact, if C = (s1cq1 + (1− s1) c
q
2
)
1/q then ∂C/∂s1 =
(1/q) (s1c
q
1
+ (1− s1) c
q
2
)
1/q−1
(cq
1
− cq
2
); hence the sign depends again on the relative dimensions
of the consumption goods.
13We point out that Cc1s1 > 0 while Cc2s1 < 0. Consequently (not considering the behavior of
the marginal productivity of labor), if Cs1 < 0 then a rise in c1 is surely needed to produce a fall in
Cc1 , whereas the equivalent statement is not always true for c2.
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3.4 What about Investment Choice?
The behavior of investments depends on the shock’s persistence. It is therefore
useful to run another set of simulations with a lower value of the autoregressive
coefficient: ρ = 0.92; the results are graphed in Figure 2. Hereafter, we focus our
explanations on the case represented by blue lines (i.e., s1 = 0.1) but the same
mechanisms are at work in the other cases—although with different results.
Some evidence emerges clearly. First, the impulse responses are less persis-
tent. Second, the intrasectoral co-movements change. In particular, reducing the
persistence of the preference shock causes the responses of sectoral investments to
change direction. Such mechanisms are much the same as those discussed by Wen
(2006, 2007) in a one-sector model: in the absence of increasing returns to scale (as
in this case), nonpersistent changes in consumption preferences crowd out invest-
ment. It follows that only persistent increases in consumption demand can sustain
investment by prompting a further increase in labor supply.14 Finally, it must be
remarked that the persistence of preferences does not affect the sign of intersectoral
co-movements because it does not affect the marginal rates of substitution between
consumption goods and leisure.
3.5 Role of the Relative Risk Aversion Coefficient (Consump-
tion)
Roughly speaking, the relative risk aversion coefficient determines how much the
marginal utility of consumption varies after a change in the consumption basket.
It is thus reasonable to assume that this parameter may be relevant in the present
framework. In order to illustrate the effects of a change in γ, we replace γ = 5 with
γ = 1.5 and then simulate the usual preference shock. The resulting dynamics are
illustrated in Figure 3.
The figure shows that, with low values of γ, the positive co-movements be-
tween sectors vanish. The reason is that the significance of the perception effect
has strongly decreased. By the dynamic equation of the first derivative of the utility
function with respect to the consumption basket (U˜C = −γC˜; see also the dynamic
equation reported in note 9), it is clear that γ is a scale factor of the effect of C on
the marginal utility of consumption. So if γ is low then variations in C have lit-
tle effect on the relative preference between consumption goods and leisure, which
means that intersectoral co-movements are infrequent.
14Just as in Wen (2006), the impulse responses show that, when ρ is low, the response of cj is
relatively higher than that of nj and yj .
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions, ρ=0.92
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3.6 Role of the Intertemporal Elasticity of Substitution (Leisure)
In the previous simulations we assumed that the marginal utility of leisure was con-
stant. This assumption allowed us to observe how the impact of both the substitution
effect and the perception effect changes without the influence of variations in the
marginal utility of leisure.
Now let’s remove this assumption and solve the model with the following utility
function: u(ct, ℓt; st) = (Ct)
1−γ−1
1−γ
+ 1
v
B(1− n1,t − n2,t)
v
, where 1− v controls the
degree of risk aversion and is inversely proportional to the elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in leisure. We set v = −1 and report the impulse response functions in
Figure 4.
Results indicate that positive intersectoral co-movements are less frequent when
v decreases. This parameter does not directly modify the perception effect or the
substitution effect among consumption goods. The different dynamics emerge ow-
ing to the behavior of the marginal utility of leisure, which is positively related to
the labor supply when v < 1. In fact, the higher labor supply in sector 1 increases
the marginal utility of leisure and then reduces the incentive to increase the labor
13
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions, γ=1.5
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supply in sector 2 as well. Under this parameterization, the perception effect is still
able to generate positive co-movements between sectoral consumption and employ-
ment, but the effect is not strong enough to support investment in sector 2. Total
labor supply is less reactive.
4 Discussion and Extensions
An important implication of the analysis so far is that a relative-preference shift is
more likely to induce sectoral comovement when the asymmetry of the composition
of the consumption index is strongly asymmetrical and risk aversion is high. Indeed,
the simulations had to be run under a quite “comfortable” parameterization in order
for clear impulse response functions to appear in the figures. This fact mandates a
discussion of the robustness and relevance of the proposed mechanism.
We begin by reporting the binding constraints required, when setting s1 and γ,
to observe intersectoral and intrasectoral co-movement. When γ = 5, we need
s1 ≤ 0.179 (for an upturn; c1c2 ≤ 0.218) or s1 ≥ 1 − 0.179 ( for a downturn;
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions, υ=-1.0
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c1
c2
≥ 4.587). Otherwise, keeping s1 = 0.1 or s1 = 0.9, we require γ ≥ 2.1, which
falls to 1.56 if s1 = 0.05 or s1 = 0.95.
The linkage between the level of risk aversion and the sectoral relative pref-
erences emerges from simulations and is consistent with the suggested economic
intuition: the former measures the effect of a change in C on the marginal util-
ity of consumption, whereas the latter determines the magnitude of the variation
of C after the preference shock. The point is that we must evaluate whether such
constraints allow the proposed mechanism to be relevant. In order to address this
issue, we reduce and make constant the value for risk aversion (next we run other
simulations with γ = 2) and then focus on interpreting of the asymmetry in the con-
sumption index. We propose two arguments to support the notion that constraints
on the parameterization setting do not vitiate the relevance of this contribution.
The first argument concerns identification of the kinds of goods. Because we
consider a general equilibrium framework, goods 1 and 2 represent all the available
goods in the economy. It follows that their relative sizes can vary considerably
according to what they represent. For example, “recent” goods may represent a
small share of the economy and yet be subject to positive preference shocks.
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The second argument concerns the range of the co-movement that has to be ex-
plained. As well documented by Hornstein (2000), most but not all industries of the
economy co-move. This implies that, in the presence of many kinds of goods, it is
important to identify a mechanism capable of explaining the co-movement among
most of them. We therefore extend our model to analyze how the proposed mech-
anism works in an economy with m different goods, and we show that a relative-
preference shock can induce the co-movement of many sectors without imposing
relevant constraints on parameters. Let’s set a more general definition of the con-
sumption index:
Ct =
m∏
j=1
c
sj,t
j , (13)
where
m∑
j=1
sj,t = 1 for all t. A shift εt in the relative preferences may change
the preference structure in the following way: sj,t = sj,t−1 + µjεt for all j with
m∑
j=1
µj = 0. In this case, the partial derivative of the consumption index with respect
to the preference shift is15
Cε = C
m∑
j=1
µj ln cj . (14)
Notice that, as in the two-sector case, the preference shock’s effect on the com-
posite consumption index influences the consumption–leisure choice in the same
direction in each sector. This connection opens endless possibilities in terms of the
composition of C and how the shock affects preferences for the different goods. In
this generalized case, the perception effect does not emerge only if
m∑
j=1
µj ln cj = 0.
Let’s focus on the case where the preference shock concerns only two kinds of
goods. For example, assume µj = 0 for j 6= 1, 2 and µ1 = −µ2 = 1. From equation
(14) it follows that
Cε = C ln
(
c1
c2
)
. (15)
Observe that this time c1 and c2 do not represent the whole economy. Equation
(15) permits us to anticipate an important result that will be confirmed by the next
simulations: Under the hypotheses characterizing this stylized economy, a prefer-
ence shift between two kinds of goods generates co-movement among all the other
15Hereafter we omit the time indices.
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goods. The implication is that, even if the perception effect is not strong enough
to induce co-movement between the sectors directly affected by the shock (sectors
1 and 2), the preference shift pushes the other m − 2 sectors in the same direction
(which changes according to the sign of ln (c1/c2)).
As an example, we solve a four-goods model with the same characteristics as
the two-goods model analyzed in previous sections. The only changes involve the
value of the relative risk aversion, γ = 2 (previously γ = 5), and the value of the
persistence coefficient of the preference shock, ρ = 0.95 (previously ρ = 0.99),
which is consistent with the empirical findings of Foster et al. (2008). We run
two sets of simulations. In the first set we consider a preference shift between two
sectors—mainly to show that, if the aim is to explain co-movement among most
(but not all) of the economic sectors, then the proposed mechanism is not signif-
icantly constrained by the parameterization of the preferences. In the second set
of simulations we analyze a preference shift among three sectors. Specifically, we
assume that an increase in preference for one sector may occur at the expense of
two other sectors. We find that if the shock is split among more than two sec-
tors, then the proposed mechanism is able to generate co-movement among sectors
whose preferences move in opposite directions with fewer binding restrictions on
the parameter setting.
The first set of simulations of the impulse response functions is graphed in Fig-
ure 5; Table 2 summarizes the setting of the preferences and reports the sectoral
outcomes. The common hypothesis is that µ1 = −µ4 = 1 and µ2 = µ3 = 0. The
analyzed cases differ in the parameterization of the relative preferences. In Case I,
the sectors directly affected by the shock have the same weight in the consumption
index; in this case, then, there is no perception effect. The sector with the positive
shock grows, the sector with the negative shock falls, and the other sectors remain
stable. In Case II, there is high asymmetry among the weights of the sectors directly
affected by the shock. The result is a strong push toward co-movement, and all the
sectors move in the same direction (up)—including the sector with the decreasing
preference. Case III and Case IV confirm that, for the sectors whose relative pref-
erences do not change, the dynamics depend on the perception effect. Indeed, it
is worth noting that, given s1 and s4: (a) the values of s2 and s3 do not affect the
dynamics of sector 2 and sector 3; and (b) that the dynamics of these sectors in Case
III are exactly the inverse of those in Case IV, since parameters have been chosen
to produce the same perception effect but with the opposite sign.
For the second set of simulations (see Table 3 and Figure 6) we assume that
µ1 = −µ4 − µ3 = 1 and µ2 = 0. Case V and Case VI are characterized by
the same structure of relative preferences but have different values of µ3 and µ4.
The perception effect is strong and pushes toward an increase in consumption in
both cases: in Case V, all the sectors experience an upturn; in Case VI, sector 4
17
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Figure 5: IRFs after a shock that affects s1 positively and s4 negatively
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experiences a downturn because it is the most negatively affected by the shock.16
The results in Case VII are similar to those in Case VI but with less asymmetry in
the size of the sectors. This indicates that the theoretical mechanism presented here
can explain co-movement also between sectors whose relative preferences go in
opposite directions (sector 1 and sector 4) without resorting to extreme parameter
settings. Finally, Case VIII represents a special combination of parameter values
that yields an almost null perception effect. This combination induces dynamics
similar to Case I (i.e., the sectors with stable relative preferences do not move).
5 Conclusions
The main intent of this paper is to suggest a new source of sectoral co-movements
during business cycles. In our model, relative-preference shocks between consump-
16Consistently with the parameterization, Figure 6 shows that sectors 1 and 2 have the same
dynamics in Case V and in Case VI, whereas sector 3 experiences a greater increase in Case VI than
in Case V.
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Table 3: Sectoral dynamics after a shock that affects s1 pos. and s4 neg.
I II III IV
s1 0.25 0.05 0.2 0.4
s2 0.4 0.05 0.3 0.2
s3 0.1 0.05 0.1 0.2
s4 0.25 0.85 0.4 0.2
µ1 1 1 1 1
µ2 0 0 0 0
µ3 0 0 0 0
µ4 −1 −1 −1 −1
Sectors in upturn 1 1, 2, 3, 4 1, 2, 3 1
Sectors in downturn 4 ∅ 4 2, 3, 4
Stable sectors 2, 3 ∅ ∅ ∅
tion goods—which may be interpreted as shocks to households’ tastes—are the
only mechanism generating fluctuation. The results indicate that, in order to induce
intersectoral and intrasectoral co-movement in a stylized economy with only two
kinds of goods, constraints on the parameter settings (especially for risk aversion
and relative preferences) are necessary but are not, in our opinion, so binding as to
render the theoretical point moot. In the last section we showed that, by extending
the analysis to a multisector model and introducing a more flexible structure for the
propagation of a preference shock, constraints on setting the parameters become
much less severe. Consistently with the empirical evidence reported in Hornstein
(2000), our model generates co-movement among most but not all industries of the
economy under a wide range of parameterizations. In this case, both the values
of the relative preferences and the spread of the preference shock determine the
direction of the co-movement and the number of sectors involved.
In fact, the entire economy tends toward expansion (recession) when preferences
shift toward goods that represent a minor (major) share in the consumption basket.
This is because households now obtain less satisfaction from the consumption bas-
ket chosen before the shock (perception effect). Consequently, they increase labor
supply in order to restore the optimal balance between leisure and each kind of
consumption good.
Our model also gives clear indications about the role of some parameters. First,
the persistence of the preference shift strongly affects the responses of investments.
This is because ρ determines the duration of the perception effect and therefore
affects the inter-temporal optimal path of consumption. Second, the coefficient of
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Figure 6: IRFs after a shock that affects s1 positively and affects s3 and s4 nega-
tively
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risk aversion, γ, determines the relevance of the perception effect in the trade-off
between consumption and leisure in each sector. Finally, if the marginal utility of
leisure is increasing in labor supply, then the perception effect must be higher in
order to generate positive intersectoral co-movements.
The mechanism sketched here is quite new in the economic literature. In fact,
multisectoral models generally tend to explain positive co-movements of economic
sectors by positing an input–output structure that transmits sectoral shocks over the
entire economy.
It should be emphasized that our model differs from models proposed by Ben-
civenga (1992) and Wen (2006, 2007), which consider direct variation in relative
preferences between consumption and leisure independently of the composition of
the consumption basket. Such variation can be due to the use of leisure time for
other activities (e.g., homework production; see Benhabib et al., 1991), it can also
be induced by alternative phases of the “urge to consume” (see Wen, 2006) that
vary the importance of consumption. In contrast, our model focuses on two other
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Table 4: SDs after a shock that affects s1 pos. and affects s3 and s4 neg.
V VI VII VIII
s1 0.05 0.05 0.2 0.25
s2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.3
s3 0.45 0.45 0.4 0.3
s4 0.45 0.45 0.35 0.15
µ1 1 1 1 1
µ2 0 0 0 0
µ3 −0.5 −0.1 −0.9 −0.75
µ4 −0.5 −0.9 −0.1 −0.25
Sectors in upturn 1, 2, 3, 4 1, 2, 3 1, 2, 4 1
Sectors in downturn ∅ 4 3 3, 4
Stable sectors ∅ ∅ ∅ 2
elements: the starting composition of the consumption basket and the shifts in rela-
tive preferences among consumption goods. The latter element is studied in Phelan
and Trejos (2000), but they use it in order to correlate aggregate fluctuations with
negative co-movement in sectoral employment.
Particularly interesting implications and extensions of the model involve the
analysis of advertising and innovation. Both factors can produce externalities strongly
resembling those analyzed in the paper. This opens up other research possibilities
in fields that lie outside this model’s current range.
Appendix
A. Steady State
From the Euler equations (11), we have
k1
n1
=
(
α1λ1
1/β − 1 + δ1
) 1
1−α1
,
k2
n2
=
(
α2λ2
1/β − 1 + δ2
) 1
1−α2
.
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Combining the first-order conditions for consumption and labor then yields
c1 =
(
s1TT
s2(1−γ)
(1− α1)λ1
B
(
k1
n1
)α1) 1γ(s1+s2)+1−s1−s2
,
c2 = TTc1,
Ct = c
s1
1 c
s2
2 ,
where TT = s2
s1
(1−α2)λ2k
α2
2 n
−α2
2
(1−α1)λ1k
α1
1 n
−α1
1
. Define Qj =
(
λj
(
kj
nj
)αj−1
− δj
)−1
. The feasi-
bility constraint then implies that
k1 = Q1c1,
k2 = Q2c2.
Finally, we use the capital accumulation process to obtain:
i1 = δ1k1,
i2 = δ2k2;
n1 =
(
k1
n1
)−1
k1,
n2 =
(
k2
n2
)−1
k2.
B. Calibration of B
We assume that
n1 + n2 = N = 0.3.
We can use equations (8) and (9) to express working time as follows:
N =
((
k1
n1
)−1
Q1 +
(
k2
n2
)−1
Q2TT
)
c1.
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After substituting the steady-state value of c1 and then finding the value of B ac-
cording to the parameterization of nj, we have
B =
(


k1
n1

−1
Q1 +

k2
n2

−1
Q2TT
γ
×

s1TT
s2(1−γ) (1− α1) λ1

k1
n1
α1

N−γ
)
.
C. Log-Linearization
• s˜1,t − c˜1,t + (1− γ) C˜t + α1k˜1,t − α1n˜1,t = 0
• s˜2,t − c˜2,t + (1− γ) C˜t + α2k˜2,t − α2n˜2,t = 0
• y1y˜1,t = c1c˜1,t + i1˜i1,t
• y2y˜2,t = c2c˜2,t + i2˜i2,t
• k1k˜1,t+1 = (1− δ1)k1k˜1,t + i1˜i1,t
• k2k˜2,t+1 = (1− δ2)k2k˜2,t + i2˜i2,t
• y˜1,t = α1k˜1,t + (1− α1) n˜1,t
• y˜2,t = α2k˜2,t + (1− α2) n˜2,t
• r1r˜1,t = α1 (α1 − 1) k
α1−1
1 n
1−α1
1 k˜1,t + α1 (1− α1) k
α1−1
1 n
1−α1
1 n˜1,t
• r2r˜2,t = α2 (α2 − 1) k
α2−1
2 n
1−α2
2 k˜2,t + α2 (1− α2) k
α2−1
2 n
1−α2
2 n˜2,t
• C˜t = s1c˜1,t + s2c˜2,t + s1 ln(c1)s˜1,t + s2 ln(c2)s˜2,t
• N˜t =
n1
N
n˜1,t +
n2
N
n˜2,t
• s2s˜2,t = −s1s˜1,t
• s˜1,t − s˜2,t − c˜1,t + c˜2,t + α1k˜1,t + (1− α1) n˜1,t = 0
• s˜2,t − s˜1,t − c˜2,t + c˜1,t + α2k˜2,t + (1− α2) n˜2,t = 0
• −p˜1,t + s˜1,t + (1− γ) C˜t − c˜1,t − (1− v)
N
1−N
N˜t = 0
• −p˜2,t + s˜2,t + (1− γ) C˜t − c˜2,t − (1− v)
N
1−N
N˜t = 0
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• 1 = s˜1,t+1 − s˜1,t + c˜1,t − c˜1,t+1 + (1− γ) C˜t+1 − (1− γ) C˜t + r˜1,t+1
• 1 = s˜2,t+1 − s˜2,t + c˜2,t − c˜2,t+1 + (1− γ) C˜t+1 − (1− γ) C˜t + r˜2,t+1
D.
Proof. In this appendix we prove that ∂2C
∂c1∂s1
> 0. From (1) it follows that
∂C
∂c1
= s1c
s1−1
1 c
1−s1
2 , 0 < s1 < 1,
and the corresponding steady-state equation is
c1
c2
=
s1
1− s1
.
The derivative of ∂C
∂c1
with respect to s1 is given by
∂2C
∂c1∂s1
= cs1−11 c
1−s1
2
(
1 + s1 ln
(
c1
c2
))
.
therefore,
1 + s1 ln
(
c1
c2
)
> 0,
from which we obtain
e >
(
c2
c1
)s1
.
Now substituting the steady-state values of c1 and c2 leads to
e1/s1s1 + s1 − 1 > 0.
Because et > t for t > 1, the following always holds:
et
t
+
1
t
− 1 > 0.
Forward equations
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E.
Proof. Here we prove that ∂2C
∂c2∂s1
< 0. By equation (1),
∂C
∂c2
= (1− s1) c
s1
1 c
−s1
2 , 0 < s1 < 1;
and, in steady state,
c1
c2
=
s1
1− s1
.
The derivative of ∂C
∂c2
with respect to s1 is
∂2C
∂c2∂s1
= −cs11 c
−s1
2
(
1− (1− s1) ln
(
c1
c2
))
,
which proves that
1− (1− s1) ln
(
c1
c2
)
> 0.
Therefore,
e >
(
c1
c2
)1−s1
,
and substituting the steady-state values of c1 and c2 leads to
e1/(1−s1) (1− s1)− s1 > 0.
Setting t = 1
1−s1
, we again conclude that:
et
t
+
1
t
− 1 > 0.
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